

The Ladder of Power in Nasseerian Iran

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Abstract

This article studies the structure of power in the Nasserian era in Iran through exploring two categories as one framework of power structure and the nature of domination and authority. The characteristic of the structure of power in Iran during the Nasserian era was dictatorship. The king was the center of gravity and the distribution of power. In this structure, the government, the court, and the king were indivisible. Consequently, they constituted obstacles to the formation of legitimate institutions and to the emergence of a bureaucratic and political structure outside the purview of the autocratic system. Existing was not possible. In such a structure, developing social classes outside the control of the government was not possible. The introduction of new ideas and the first attempts to reform Iran took place in the Qajar era and were faced with challenges in the power structure.. On the other hand, with the rapid growth of foreign trade and the increasing collision of Iranian businessmen with the west, the foreign trips and acquaintance with the achievements of western civilization, they became aware of their class status and their class interests against the Qajar government.

Keywords: Power structure, intellectuals, businessmen, Nasser al-Din Shah, reforms.

1. Introduction

In Explaining the Political Structure of Iran, theories in historical and political sociology of feudalism, oriental despotism, alienation and patrimony historical accounts about Iran are cited. Patrimonialism is one of the dominant discourses in Iran before the constitutional revolution. Patrimonialism, in Max Weber's political sociology, is an evolutionary form of gerontocracy process or patriarchalism or traditional folk favorite, with inherited succession rules (Weber, 1995: 328,340). Unlike the first two forms of royal domination, patrimonialism is a form of traditional political rule in which a royal family seizes compulsory power through the court apparatus. Patrimonial ruler selects the executive apparatus amongst the following: 1. Relatives 2. Trusted incarceration and puppet 3. The freelance employees, who respect the ruler and who ruled first from the personal table and then from the articles and the right to assemble. Taxes are given by the ruler.

In such a system of inheritance, the administration of affairs and the political power is in the direct personal control of the ruler. In this traditional structure, the king is at the forefront of power and forms the bureaucratic relations and the hierarchy of power. The staff of this system are the king's servants. The leader has unlimited power (Haman, 324-327). Traditional patrimonialism was the discourse of a particular kingdom under certain circumstances, which was shaped by the Safavi and Qajar periods. Traditional Iranian patrimonialism in general emphasized the absolute authority and obedience to the king, and to the vertical and unilateral power structure, etc. Traditional patrimonialism was a barrier to the formation of individualism, the political practices, and the freedom of thought and action. Instead, it placed pressure on the king's obedience, opportunism, authoritarianism, passivity, political inactivity, silent protest, widespread fear, cynicism, and political mistrust. In the cosmos of patrimonialism, on the one hand, a space of skepticism and mistrust was made between the people, and on the other hand, between the people and the rulers. It reduced the ability of citizens to live in civic life. The main features of such a culture included the following: the mistrust of the people, the aptitude and suspicion of the government, the overwhelming fear, the feeling of inadequacy and so forth (Haman, 381, 359, 351).

In the political structure of Iran, the basis for the combination of political power are namely, the heads of the Qajar tribe, the princes, the courtiers, the high bureaucratic elements, the great aristocrats, the governors of the provinces, and the chiefs of the tribes. and the readers was the Shah and the key elements. In this structure of power, loyalty to the royal family, the court office, and the ownership of the land were the three major elements to the power structure. Qajar king was at the top of the power pyramid. He played a central role in the hierarchy of authority; he was regarded as the principal actor of power in the distribution of political power. This had important cultural and social consequences; there is the disappearance of individuality and human differences, expanding the culture of flattery, closure of thought and criticism, loyalty to the king, and pure obedience. The king did not show any interest in his country.. In the structure of power in the Nasserian era, the king was the center of the universe, and all the rest were slaves even courtiers. The ruling ideology was also trying to show that opposing such a power structure with the king at its top was considered to be an enemy of God. An important question arises: what factors challenged the structure of power in the Nazareth age? Accordingly, this research claims the following factors had an influence on the Nasserian era: reformed intellectuals, businessmen, clergymen influenced by modernity, and power structure.

2. The Nature of Domination and Authority in the Nasserian Era

Studying Iranian political history without researching the ups and downs of the tribal history and the nomads will not be possible. The main basis of the political power of the Qajar government like any other in the period of Iranian history was based on the tribal structure; the tribes had the real power of the country. At the end of the eighteenth century with the death of Karim Khan Zand and the decline of the political power of this family, the Qajar tribe was able to influence and expand his authority. Qajar's coming to power is a kind of shift in power in Iran's provincial structure. Like the Qajar kings, Nasser Al-Din Shah was more influenced by the tribal and provincial glory in his structure. The tribal culture in the construction of power leads to patriarchy or monarchy (patrimonialism). According to this model of power, people are ruled by respect and have no right to compete. In this regard, the political system is always regarded as the enemy of the political opposition, and therefore, politics is more about the elimination of competitors, and the success of the system. Politics depends entirely on the repudiation of popular participation, and indeed on this power structure. It faces a culture of citizenship rather than a culture of participation. According to the tribal culture, the king Qajar, as the main actor of power, was the protector of the political and economic power of the Qajar tribe and the epitome of stability and system in society. According to the structure of power in the Nasserian age, the formal political culture had elements such as absolute obedience to the government, the sanctity of the government and the ruler, the inheritance of power, and viewing the king as the shadow of god. The Shah, since he had the status of shadow of god, made decisions and commands without being questioned by anyone; the people had to obey him. Therefore, in the Qajar political system, as in the previous dynasties in Iran, the Shah was the center of gravity of power, and all powers and responsibilities were given to him, and the people were all his slaves, and he was the benefactor of them all. The Shah had vast and absolute power. Tasks such as declaring war, concluding peace, tax determination, assigning fief, and so on. He was the highest judicial authority in the country (Etemad Al-Saltane, 1995: 174-1/175).

Al-Saltaneh, in his work "The Trance", also refers to the personality of the saintly Qajar king, and he declares his authority free from any questions (Hemo, 1978: 42). The dominant ideology sought to differentiate the Qajar king from the human race, as he was considered a royal authority among the people and fighting against him was similar to fighting against God (Hemo, 1970: 141-142). The cruelty of the Qajar kings was also in the hands of the Western people as when Nasser al-Din Shah visits Farang, the German emperor says in a farewell manner to the Iranian king: "It is as if

justice cannot be done without a neck” (Hedayat, 1996: 131). In a report by Mirzayahya Dolatabadi on the condition of Iran in 1921 AH, he points out that the personal power of Nasser al-Din Shah was expanded because of the death of the great men, the great princes, and the taking of the affairs of the country into the hands of those trained under the king (Dolatabadi, 1957: 1/100). He believed that the situation in the country was such that he had to be involved with the transgressors or accept miseries (Haman, 120).

This tyranny was reinforced by flattery, hypocrisy, and lies by the Shah's entourage. He considered every nonsense to be heavenly, and regarded every act as justification, blasphemy and righteousness, and this deprived him of all imperfections and errors (Sayyah, 1980 :75). Nasser al-Din Shah had become so overwhelmed in the orphanage that he had no opportunity to handle the affairs of the country (Majdolmalek, 1942: 2-3; Dolatabadi, 1957: 1/46). He prevented new thoughts, which led to the disruption of the livelihoods and the bringing of more traditional thinkers to work. A person such as Mirzaalikhhan Amin al-Dawlah, who was a reformist and familiar with new ideas, was assigned to head the council of the court and the post ministry. He had authority and dignity in and out of Iran (Dolatabadi, 1957: 1/46).

3. The Hierarchy of Power and Authority in the Structure of Power

Seeking to elucidate the structure of political power in the Nasserian era, this paper seeks to address the hierarchy of authority, the major actors of power, and the distribution of political power in the Nasserian era. In the political structure of Iran, the basis of the combination of political power is the “Shah” and the “principal elements”, which are namely the heads of the Qajar tribe, the princes, the courtiers, the supreme elements of the divine court, the great aristocracy (Al-Saltanehs, Al-Dolehs, Al-Maleks, Al-Mamaleks) the monarchs, and the rulers and the chiefs of the tribes and khans, who held the government offices and monopolies in their own regions. Since the king was the distributor of the power, the removal and installation of government agents was carried out at his command, with all the details of the government income and expenses to his signature. Provincial instructions, customs clearance orders, and rentals were approved by him (Mostofi, 1958: 1/394; Sheikholeslami, 1971: 105). The Shah, by his own will, ordered the seizure and confiscation of the property of others, as far as Ehtesham al-Saltanah declares: Their uncles, brothers, nephews, sons, the people of the country, and the elders were not immune from such attacks by the Shah (Ehtesham Al-Saltanah: 124).

One of the special problems of the Qajar system was the existence of numerous princes during the reign of Fathalishah, which existed until the end of the Qajar dynasty (Hedayat, 1984: 53-56). The designated successor to the king at the head of the princes was the crown prince who was chosen as a child according to the Qajar custom. He was appointed to the government of Azerbaijan and resided in Tabriz. With the rise of the number of princes, at the beginning of the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, a considerable number of cattlemen received their attention. There was a certain division in this class. The issue of blood and race was the basis of this division, which had a class and political identity. Accordingly, during Fathali's reign, the princes were divided into two groups: one group, which presented the son of the king or his eldest son, Abbasmirza Baqi, and the other group presented the other children of the king, who were not attributable to the Qajars through their mother.

Provincial government, which in itself led to the seizure of landowners, was often at the disposal of first-rate princes who were the most senior government officials. For example, one can mention Abdolhossein Mirza Farmanfarma (Mirza Farmanfarma, 12-24/1) and Abrahamkhan Zahir al-Dawlah (Bastani Parizi, 1979: 14-10). The second group of princes relied heavily on bureaucratic pensions, and they had little role in governing the country and in the structure of power. The Qajar kings gave them government-owned real estate and farms to cover the expense of the princes and princesses, thus, in addition to having the title of princess and governing the provinces and states, they were great landowners. Other key elements in the structure of power were the courtiers and the supreme elements of courtship, which were considered to be the most important elements of the Qajar government, consisting of three groups:

The royal family, the grand chancellor and the high court officers. The large group of bureaucrats refers to the grand chancellor and all the court clerks, together with the high court officials; they administered the affairs of the State and had the most influence on the government (Pollock, 1989: 37)

The largest bureaucratic authority was the Supreme Chancellor, who was called by various nicknames such as Etemad al-Dawlah, Amir, Amir al-Dawlah, vice-chancellor and the supreme chancellor. The chancellor was the true representative of the government. He used the elements of justice, the political, social and economic affairs to govern the country. The chancellor and the ministers were the main bureaucrats of power at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid. In the bureaucracy of the Nasserian era, the chancellor was always regarded as a servant of the king,

avored by the king for managing all affairs (Meredith, 1971: 5; Bakhash, 1971: 7). There was often a disagreement between him and the Shah, sometimes at the expense of the chancellor, indicating the lack of independence of the supreme court. The Shah's decision-making was always decisive in all matters of staff recruitment, promotion and dismissal. The Shah was the source of all authority. He knew all government positions were his own and was free to delegate them. All the revenues of the government were also in the possession of the Shah. The right to exploit all the resources of the country and the public facilities such as the drag telegraph lines, road construction, the construction of railways and the mining belonged to him.

The growth of the bureaucratic system during this period was confined only to the organization of the public administration. Other political, economic, and partly educational activities were still traditionally administered.

The official system and bureaucracy of the Nasserian era was not based on the division of professionalism, rationality, and meritocracy, which helped the functioning of the political system, but was based on the vesting of officials and offices in the context of kinship and tribal bonds and even selling Jobs (Sayyah, 1980: 78; Etemad al-Saltanah, 1971: 804; Karzen, 1983: 1,438; Kermani, 1967: 126). This led to weakness and inefficiency of the government.

In the structure of power, the bureaucracy was in fact expanding the influence and sources of income of the Shah's family so that the government offices were transferred to others as income, and the government officials regarded it as their ancestral property.

The administrative jurisdiction was also defined by the extent to which the Shah was designated. The ministries and the highest institutions of the country were nothing but the Shah's monopolies (Sheikholeslami, 1997: 139-171). Thus, wealth and power in Iran during the Qajar era coexisted perfectly, so that wealth was often necessary and sufficient to achieve political and administrative matters.

Power, on the other hand, created sufficient conditions to earn money, leading to a higher political office, which in turn led to greater political power (Zounis, 2008: 223).

One of the peculiarities of power structure in Nazarene Iran was that it was only possible to gain and maintain political power in order to enter the class of landowners, and to rely on landlordism

(Lambton, 1984: 286). So far in the structure of power, the royal family, high-ranking administrative and military officials, as well as the heads of tribes were considered the largest landowners in the country. A report on the situation of the country shows that the landholders, princes, the nobles, and the chiefs of the tribes and army commanders forced the Russians to pay heavy taxes. At the end of the 19th century, Massoud Mirzazil al-Sultan occupied two-fifths of the country's territory and owned it officially (Karzan, 1983: 1/ 546).

For 22 years, the Natanz area was held by Hesam Al-Saltanah (Aminal-Dawlah, 1971: 30-31). The “Nye” area held 100-year-old house of the mausoleum (Masoutofi, 2009: 1/ 476). The “Ravand” and “Nooshabad” districts of Kashan were the permanent property of Isa Biglerbigi's family (Trustees, 1971: 32). The above examples illustrate the profound link between the economic structure and its major part, which reflected the landholding and the power structure in Iran during the Qajar era (Keddie, 2008: 7/176). Thus, during the Nasserian era, dependence on the royal family, obtaining a court post and land ownership were among the three essential elements of the power structure. One of the notable points in the structure of power in the Nasserian era was overlapping structure. That is to say, in this political system, in addition to the existence of the head of the power pyramid, the king, the subnational networks also played a role in determining the fate of the country. And by conspiracy, deceit, enslavement, and mercy, they changed the orientation and early access to the top of the pyramid of power for the benefit of the king. This overlapping power has been well studied by Mirzamohammadkhan Majdolmalek. He attempts to expose the influence of these power networks on Nasser al-Din Shah.

4. Failure of Reforms to Challenge the Power Structure

The power structure during the Qajar era of Iran treated any change as deviation and breakthrough. The influence of the tribal culture on power structure, sugarcane culture, and pure adherence hampered the flourishing of the culture of reasoning, comment and criticism, and the principle of accountability in the political and social system. The right of people to protest was merely an obligation rather than a social right.

The contemporary thoughts and the first attempts to reform Iran by state bureaucrats and practitioners occurred when delegates were sent by the Qajar court to Western countries, such as the Russian and Ottoman countries, in order to observe the institutions and manifestations of

modern civilization in those countries and to compare the situation of Iran with a new world. With the wish of a developed country, they thought of adopting new systems and new ways of living by the Europeans. The Qajar kings opposed the formation of new political and social institutions and saw it as a threat to their political power. Nasseral-Din Shah did not hesitate to suppress elites and statesmen such as Amirkabir. The reforms were approved by the Qajar king until they challenged their tyrannical rule, and their view of the reforms was in fact nothing to reinforce their tyrannical system. Therefore, reforms in the era of Amirkabir and Sepahsalar, which sought to establish the authority of the central Iranian government, led to an increase in the efficiency and power of the tyrannical Qajar government, and to political participation and development.

The reformist ideals of the Nasserian era failed to realize in the 19th century Iran's transition to a modern state through “reforms from above”. In the first place, the Qajar government's reforms were not the result of the functioning of the independent social classes and the modern bureaucratic system, but rather they were a result of Western influence on Iran's political structure. One of the major obstacles to the Qajar government's reforms was the influence of the tribesmen on the power structure, with the royal family and their rulers at the forefront.

They had a privileged socio-economic status, supported by a patriarchal bureaucratic bureaucracy that was responsible for provincial government, the acquisition of large tracts of land and villages, and the taxation of the wealthiest Iranians. Reforms aimed at strengthening the authority of the state in the first place and necessitated the change of the patriarchal system of appointment of provincial governors, the imposition of strict and stringent regulations on the treasury, and the reduction of court costs, in opposition to provincial governors and clergy. In the face of these oppositions, Nasser al-Din Shah sacrificed one of his reformist chancellors, Amirkabir, and ousted him. Amirkabir's reforms were a serious obstacle to the resources of Russia and Britain. Eventually the wave of opposition to Amirkabir intensified and led to the assassination of Amir.

Nazimoleslam Kermani believed that in the fifty years of Nasseral-Din Shah's reign, Iran did not take a step towards reform and lost 50 of the best moments of the Iranian society free of charge. And anyone who sought to promote Iran's progress was assassinated and, as he put it, “as if he were not in Iran a nobleman who did not tear down his tyranny,” and any minister who gained little power immediately, it weakened him (Kermani, 1967: 127).

Reforming Iran's affairs on the basis of new world interests was in conflict with the Qajar kings. When the power structure evaluates reform as opposed to maintaining a framework of its interests, it will clearly resist it. Reforms were needed because the scope of authority and the social control of the Qajar kings was restricted or completely lost. Nasser al-Din Shah's attention was to those parts of the reform that would enhance his personal financial and political interests, where one would never find sections such as law-making. He was worried that he would not be able to restrain the speed of the reforms and feared losing his monarchy and government. Nasser al-Din Shah was an enemy of education, which leads to the freedom of pen and thought (Kermani, 1967: 127).

According to Ehteshamal-Saltanah, Nasser al-Din Shah was unwilling to promote European-style education in Iran, because he believed his kingdom rested on the shoulders of the illiterate masses (Ehtesham Al-Santaneh, 1988: 315-316). In a report that Nazim al-Islam Karamani gives to Nasser al-Din Shah's view of reform, Nasser al-Din considers the king so tyrannical that if his most beloved son would speak of reform, they would lose sight of him, and this would drive them to the black soil, stating that anyone who favors reform will be the same as Nasser al-Din Shah.

Mirza Yahya of the Abadi government believed that if internal and external considerations did not stop, Nasser al-Din Shah would shut down Dar al-Fonoon and leave no trace (Dolatabadi, 1957: 1/47). Even with the presence of a French teacher outside of Dar al-Fonoon, Nasser al-Din Shah is heavily in charge of Dar al-Fonoon Jafarqul Khan. The teacher asked him to go to the French Embassy and tell the French Minister that there is Dar al-Fonoon. If this French teacher wants to teach, she should teach at Dar al-Fonoon, and the French teacher's class will eventually close. According to Mirzayahya Dolatabadi's analysis, Nasser al-Din Shah's insistence on restricting education and overseeing Dar al-Fonoon and preventing the obtaining of education outside his jurisdiction was due to the fact that he taught French to the French people among the Iranians (Haman: 48).

5. The Struggle of Intellectuals with the Power Structure

Iranian intellectuals were a new social group who, in the Nasserian era, were more concerned with the rule of law and the constitution and the establishment of a constitutional government, in the face of the power structure, the main characteristic of which was authoritarianism. They did not believe in the divine right of the Qajar kings. Iranian intellectuals have identified the structure of power as

one of the major obstacles to making fundamental changes in the economic, social, political, and religious structures of the Iranian society.

In the time of Nasser al-Din Shah, tribal authority was decreased in the face of the new world, and with the introduction of concepts such as law, citizenship, liberty, ...etc., and concepts of traditional Iranian political culture such as respect and dignity. It was challenged by the Iranian intellectuals and Shah Qajar, who had the highest office of political power in the Iranian political culture, and was subjected to rapid and endless criticism by intellectuals. Businessmen and intellectuals came closer to each other because of their intellectual convergence in making reforms and understanding the important relationship of economic and political development. The intellectuals recognized the necessity of political transformation for cultural and economic change and came to the realm of enlightenment and political reform. By comparing the Iranian society with western societies, they noted the causes of backwardness in the Iranian society. These enlightenments brought the intellectuals closer to the big businessmen, in view of the economic developments in Iran and their connection with the social and political developments. These two groups pursued Iran's economic independence (Torabi Farsi, 2005: 54-53). The close and sincere relations of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asad Abadi and Amin al-Zarb can be mentioned. In these meetings, Amin al-Zarb and merchants became familiar with the thinking and ideas of Sayyid Jamal concerning the law, freedom of thought, reform of Muslim affairs, alienation from the country's economy, and the struggle against colonialism and despotism (Rahbari, 2008: 59).

Amin al-Zarb visited Russian factories in Moscow under the guidance of Seyyed Jamal al-Din. These included factories such as Mahoot, Cheet, Smelter, melting iron factory, road and rail. Sayed Jamal sought to make Amin al-Zarb more familiar with the Russian industry. He sought to acquaint Iranian businessmen with the achievements of Western civilization and modernization and encourage them to invest (Mahdavi, 2001:203). Amin Al-Zarb in Moscow met two brothers, Mirza Mohammad Ali and Mirza Mohammad Hussein, who were Iranian specialists active in the road construction sector in Russia. Amin al-Zarb invited them to build the railways and returned them to Iran afterwards, and they refused, pointing out that there is no guarantee of investment due to the lack of law and therefore security. (Haman) Amin Al-Zarb in Iran was well aware of the necessity of legalization. Mirzamalkam Khan and Iranian businessmen had realized that their presence in large investments to modernize Iran was similar to Amin Al-Zarb's determination, which was depended on the establishment of the law to rebuild Iran. The establishment of law also requires

significant changes in the structure of power.

6. The Struggle of Businessmen with the Power Structure

In the economic structure of Qajar, businessmen were among the most powerful and richest social classes of the Iranian society. The accelerated growth of foreign trade and the increasing collision of the Iranian merchants with the West and foreign trips made them familiar with the achievements of the western civilization earlier than the other classes (Ashraf, 2002: 106-107; Katouzian: 100). Their acquaintance with Iranian intellectuals made them aware of their class status and their class interests against the Qajar Despotic rule (Ashraf, 2002: 131). This awareness increased their political, social and economic power and social status in the Iranian society, and eventually led to a series of political, social and economic developments resulting from the concession of power by the Russian and British colonial states. It also resulted in the discrimination between the Iranian and Western merchants. Their awareness of the economic liberalism meant that the government was not involved in the economy, and the private ownership freedom that led to a movement against the Qajar government, and the formation and effective role in political and economic movements such as the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Movement.

Like the other classes in the Qajar era, the business class was not only independent of the state but was completely dependent on the state and the political power did not allow for the development of independent social classes. Therefore, the government was not agent of any class, including businessmen, but these classes were dominated by the government, and these classes were legal before the state. Thus, the merchants had no choice and had to resist against the power structure to achieve their class independence.

On the other hand, the power structure, and above all Nasser al-Din Shah, sought to obtain economic independence from the merchant class by selling domestic resources to foreigners. From the reign of Agha Mohammad Khan to the era of Nasser al-Din Shah (until the end of Amir Kabir's rule), there was no transfer of economic concessions to foreigners. Merchants had considerable influence with government officials due to their high liquidity levels and were respectful to the king and courtier and come to the aid of the government in severe financial crises (Gobino, B: 30-30). For example, Abbas Mirza borrowed a businessman after the defeat of the Russians. Or, since the government of the cities was sold for cash, the rulers would take the necessary cash from the

merchants before purchasing the court. In some cases, merchants were assisted in paying deferred tax or government debt (Sepehr, 1966: 4/17). The struggle of the businessmen with the power structure after the victory of the Constitutional Revolution made the businessmen gain their political power and become a political class by obtaining the agent of the first Majlis (Rahbari, 2008: 12).

On another note, intellectuals and businessmen were concerned with the economic concessions that the Qajar government had monopolized the western colonial governments (Teimuri, 1944: 89). There is also the increase in import of green goods into Iran and the subsequent decline of national industries as a result of wrong customs policies. It caused merchants to enter the struggle on two fronts, one is tyranny and the other is colonialism. It first sought the creation of a parliament of businessmen's lawyers in Tehran and large cities, and later their movement peaked in the Tobacco Movement and then reached its full potential in the Constitutional Movement.

The focus of colonial powers was primarily on purely political profits and then with the emergence and expansion of the world market at the end of the thirteenth century, their economic profits along with their political interests came to their attention. Foreign commercial boom was due to the export of raw materials and the import of products from the growing western industries and the dependence of domestic markets on international markets. But the rise of foreign businessmen and the widespread trade relationship between Iranian businessmen and foreign businessmen led to the dependence of Iranian businessmen on Western business institutions. According to Hajj, business became a foreign dealing, not the promotion of Homeland products (Sayah, 1980: 472). Cheza Mirza Ali mentions that the discriminatory customs policy of the Qajar government against the merchants of Iran caused the merchants to have more profit in buying and selling goods from European merchants, where as Isfahan merchants represented the European businesses and bought mainly goods from European businesses, which were gradually sold to the market (Genab, 1925: 118; Ashraf, 2002: 96). Zainalabidin Maraghey calls these merchants mercenaries who are enemies of their own home (Maraghey, 1966: 164-163). Etemad al-Saltaneh, while referring to the events of the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, referred to this issue as "Complete prevalence of foreign goods in Iran" (Etemad Al-Saltanah, 1995: 118/1). Hajj Sayyad about the adverse effects of the boom in green goods believed that Iran's industries would be destroyed in a short period of time and that the Iranian people would become distressed and hungry (Sayyah, 1980: 211-210).

Due to the proliferation of green goods and especially rich textiles, the country's textile industries

and especially the textile industries of the central industrial cities of Isfahan, Kashan and Yazd declined (Ashraf, 2002: 91-92; Flanden, 1978: 125). Thus, the historical obstacles to the growth of new and modern industrial capitalism and democracy in Iran were the result of the interplay of nomadic production with other modes of production, and the domination of tribes over urban and rural communities, and it was also the result of external obstacles to capitalist growth from the semi-colonial situation and the economic and political changes of the Iranian society under colonial domination (Ashraf, 2002: 126).

7. Businessmen's Lawyers Congress

At the time Mirza Hussein Khan Mushir al-Dawlah was chancellor in 1911, the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture was established, which was in charge of protecting the profits of the businessmen and defending their rights against the violation of the divine agents and to provide the means of growth and development of commercial transactions in the country. However, in practice, the Ministry, like other court systems at the time, became a tool to subdue businessmen and an excuse for the intervention of the court practitioner like Zal al-Sultan and Kamran Mirza and Amin al-Sultan and the representatives of the Ministry of Commerce were not allowed (Malekara, 1947: 102-103, 169).

Businessmen's frequent traders and their protests came to the Shah's ears by Amin al-zarb and Nasser al-Din Shah removed Nassir al-Dawlah from the Ministry of Commerce. In a handwriting in Shawwal in 1923 AH, he ordered the formation of a congress of Business Lawyers (Adamiat, 1978: 310-311). The Statute provisions of Businessmen's lawyer's congress express the preservation and safeguarding of the class profits of businessmen by limiting the authoritarian (power structure) and colonial powers, the lack of a proper judicial system, and the violence of provincial rulers against businessmen.

The businessmen lawyer's congress was the first organization to reflect the political demands of an important economic group whose members were chosen from among themselves. However, despite the efforts of Amin Al-Zarb, these organizations did not have enough impact, and it was clear that the formation of a House of Business Lawyers with the authority that the businessmen favored, regarding the power structure in Iran, caused limitation to the authority of the rulers and also eliminated one of the major ways of their intervention. Therefore, most of the state and provincial

and religious rulers stood up to the House of Business Lawyers and did not abstain from all kinds of corporations. The ministers of Kamran Mirza Nayeb Al-Saltanah and Mokhber Al-Dawlah, the Minister of Commerce and the chancellor, and the governors of Nayib Al-Saltaneh, Zal Al-Sultan, Asif Al-Dawleh and Motman Al-Saltaneh provinces opposed the House of Commons (Haman, 362-363). Finally, they could in the jet of their own interests, businessmen's lawyers congress bared their influence as a cruel court system and prevented the formation of class interests of businessmen from a politically, economically and socially institutionalized form of power. Thus, the businessmen's lawyers congress was the first economic organization with political character before the constitution, the elected agents of one of the social classes, with their own efforts and attempts, came into being within the ruling system. They existed within the ruling system (Haman: 369).

8. Conclusion

According to the characteristics of the Iranian patrimonialism and authoritarianism, dictatorship is a prominent feature of the power structure in the Nazarene era. The Shah's power did not depend on any social class and the foundations of his power were not taken away from society, and this was due to the continuation of power's autocracy. It never had the opportunity to establish an independent, impartial and legal class that could legally restrict the king's power.

However, the Nasserian era was a transition from the traditional tribal and bureaucratic system to the modern monarchy and bureaucracy. But the Qajar era's power structure in its approach to reform was focused on those parts of the reform that reinforced financial and political interests and did not affect sectors such as customary law.

Nasser Al-Din Shah, in spite of his familiarity with western civilization and the need for reform, sought to consolidate the power structure at the top of his pyramid, and to use the reforms to strengthen his autocratic rule and centralize autocratic government. In this regard, the reforms of the Nasserian era were not infrastructural or more precisely structural, and only led to the formal expansion of the state administrative system or bureaucratic inflation. The Iranian government in the Qajar era relied on the existence of a large centralized administrative organization with political and economic power in the hands of their kings, who were known to be autocratic. The government could not be separated from the court and a modern state was formed.

Understanding modernity in Iran and explaining the performance of reformist intellectuals and

businessmen and their impact on shaping the Tobacco and Constitutional Movements will be difficult without examining the power structure in Nazarene Iran. In fact, these movements can be considered the starting point of the challenge to the power structure in Iran. Thus, the Qajari patrimonial government, which was based on traditional legitimacy in the context of the social experience of the Iranian people, was challenged only in the late nineteenth century when intellectuals came to terms with new concepts and western views such as the rule of law. And since the Iranian economic system relies on the existence of a large, centralized bureaucratic organization with a focus on political and economic power at the hands of the authoritarian and dictator Qajar kings. Thus, the root of the political and economy backwardness of Iran goes back to the power structure, which is authoritarian and dictatorship. Iranian intellectuals in the Nasserian era sought to liberate the political, economic, social and cultural systems of the Iranian society from the power structure at the top was Nasser Al-Din Shah.

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